Cheltenham Systems

Investigatory Powers Act

There’s a new law in the UK which controls how government and local authorities can use investigatory powers like checking phone records, following suspects, and listening to (tapping) phone calls.

It’s called the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and it takes over from a number of previous bits of legislation, principally the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

As well as the general public, whose rights and security are affected by it, there are three main groups of people who care about it deeply:

  1. the civil society, privacy advocates who want to make sure the government doesn’t pry more and more, driven by fear of security incidents, and private lives (and thoughts) become a thing of the past
  2. the law enforcement and security agencies who have an important job to do for us, and who are limited in what they can do by this legislation and the procedures it demands
  3. the government, and parliament, who are finally responsible for our security and the protection of our rights

Previously, for the more invasive powers like phone interception, a Secretary of State (e.g. the Home Secretary) would consider the case and, if she/he felt it was proportionate use of powers – the privacy invasion was merited by the seriousness of the risk posed – then she would sign a warrant and the police or agencies concerned would get on with it.

As part of the long arguments about the new Act, this was seen as the government being in a position where they were both responsible for security and the assessment of proportionality. It was argued that she/he could do with a second opinion on the more serious cases to both back up that decision in the eyes of those who don’t trust the government to be fair, and also to prevent a gradual slide into more and more intrusive investigations, fuelled by political pressure to reduce crime and terrorism.

This brought in a fourth group of key players: the Judicial Commissioners, led by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner himself, Sir Adrian Fulford.

These Commissioners will soon be operating the new Act’s “double lock” process on the use of the more serious powers, judging whether the use of powers is proportionate to the aims sought by the investigation. The government ministers will still be responsible for using the powers, but the Commissioners will have to be content that the use will be proportionate.

The previous oversight bodies have been brought together into a single oversight group, called IPCO – the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office – which contains the Commissioner and his Commissioners, Inspectors, and a staff of civil servants who keep all the wheels on.

In addition to the experience and knowledge within IPCO, there’s a also a Technology Advisory Panel (brought into being by the new Act) who offer technology advice to the Commissioners and Inspectors, and ensure that new techniques are considered which might offer reduced intrusion for the same investigatory effects.

To watch the day-by-day evolution of IPCO, check the @IPCOffice Twitter feed.

JD